C.002The Tech Dynasty Calculator
The dynasty question for the age of the Nasdaq: a family puts part of its fortune in tech, either QQQ or the ten biggest Nasdaq-100 stocks, and the rest in Harry Browne’s permanent portfolio. How much can it spend each year at the prices the rich pay, selling or borrowing, through the markets since 1987?
The Dynasty Calculator (C.001) asks how much a family can spend each year and keep its buying power at the prices the rich pay, with a stocks-and-bonds portfolio and 98 years of history. This one asks the same question for the modern era, with a different portfolio: part of the fortune in tech, either QQQ or the ten biggest Nasdaq-100 stocks in equal parts, re-picked every year, and the rest in Harry Browne’s permanent portfolio, a quarter each in stocks, long Treasuries, gold and cash. The history runs from 1987 to 2025, so it includes the internet boom and bust, 2008 and 2022, and the long run since 2009 in which QQQ returned 20.5% a year.
Spending rises with CPI plus 1.8% a year, compounded: what prices of things the rich buy did from 2000 to 2025 (F.004). The results are hypothetical, built from historical data: not a forecast, and not investment, tax or legal advice.
What the fortune is worth, in today’s top-of-the-K prices
Data
How much tech the draw needs
Chance of keeping the fortune’s buying power, by the share in tech (the rest in the permanent portfolio), with everything else as set. Selling and borrowing side by side; the dots are your mix.
Data
How big the loan gets
Data
What actually happened
Data
The ingredients
Annual returns, compounded, by the year the history starts, through 2025. Total returns with dividends and interest, before tax and fees, except the Nasdaq-100 before 1999: its price change, as in Nasdaq’s own total-return index.
| 1987–2025 | 1999–2025 | 2009–2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| QQQ (the Nasdaq-100 before it) | 14.7% | 10.8% | 20.5% |
| Ten biggest Nasdaq-100 stocks, equal parts | — | 12.5% | 22.5% |
| S&P 500 | 11.2% | 8.4% | 14.7% |
| Long Treasuries (Vanguard Long-Term Treasury fund) | 5.8% | 4.1% | 1.9% |
| Gold | 6.4% | 10.6% | 9.9% |
| Cash (3-month T-bills) | 3.1% | 2.0% | 1.3% |
| Permanent portfolio (a quarter each of the four above) | 7.3% | 7.0% | 7.5% |
| CPI | 2.8% | 2.6% | 2.6% |
| Top-of-the-K prices (CPI plus the premium) | 4.7% | 4.4% | 4.4% |
The ten, year by year
The ten largest Nasdaq-100 companies at the end of each year, held in equal parts through the next, with each one’s total return that year. For 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 the list is from the September 30 before, the latest found. Tickers are as they were then. QQQ’s 1999 figure is Nasdaq’s total-return index; QQQ itself began trading that March.
| Year | The ten, and each one’s return | All ten | QQQ |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1999 | MSFT +68%, INTC +39%, CSCO +131%, WCOM +11%, DELL +39%, ORCL +290%, SUNW +262%, AMGN +130%, TCOMA +22%, YHOO +265% | 125.7% | 102.1% |
| 2000 | MSFT −63%, QCOM −53%, CSCO −29%, INTC −27%, ORCL +4%, YHOO −86%, WCOM −74%, SUNW −28%, DELL −66%, NXTL −52% | −47.3% | −36.1% |
| 2001 | CSCO −53%, MSFT +53%, QCOM −39%, INTC +5%, ORCL −52%, SUNW −56%, JDSU −79%, VRTS −49%, SEBL −59%, AMGN −12% | −34.0% | −33.3% |
| 2002 | MSFT −22%, INTC −50%, CSCO −28%, QCOM −28%, ORCL −22%, AMGN −14%, DELL −2%, MXIM −37%, IMNX −34%, CEFT −52% | −28.9% | −37.4% |
| 2003 | MSFT +7%, INTC +107%, QCOM +49%, CSCO +85%, AMGN +28%, DELL +27%, ORCL +23%, CMCSA +39%, EBAY +91%, MXIM +51% | 50.6% | 49.7% |
| 2004 | MSFT +9%, INTC −27%, CSCO −20%, QCOM +58%, NXTL +7%, AMGN +4%, DELL +24%, CMCSA +1%, EBAY +80%, ORCL +4% | 14.0% | 10.5% |
| 2005 | MSFT −1%, QCOM +2%, EBAY −26%, INTC +8%, CSCO −11%, NXTL +15%, DELL −29%, AMGN +23%, AAPL +123%, SBUX −4% | 10.1% | 1.6% |
| 2006 | MSFT +16%, QCOM −11%, AAPL +18%, INTC −17%, GOOG +11%, AMGN −13%, EBAY −30%, CSCO +60%, SBUX +18%, YHOO −35% | 1.5% | 7.1% |
| 2007 | MSFT +21%, AAPL +133%, QCOM +6%, GOOG +50%, CSCO −1%, INTC +34%, CMCSA −35%, SBUX −42%, AMGN −32%, ORCL +32% | 16.6% | 19.0% |
| 2008 | AAPL −57%, MSFT −44%, GOOG −56%, QCOM −8%, RIMM −64%, CSCO −40%, INTC −44%, ORCL −21%, GILD +11%, EBAY −58% | −38.0% | −41.7% |
| 2009 | AAPL +147%, QCOM +31%, MSFT +60%, GILD −15%, GOOG +102%, ORCL +39%, CSCO +47%, INTC +44%, AMGN −2%, TEVA +34% | 48.6% | 54.7% |
| 2010 | AAPL +53%, MSFT −7%, QCOM +9%, GOOG −4%, ORCL +29%, CSCO −16%, TEVA −6%, INTC +6%, AMZN +34%, RIMM −14% | 8.5% | 20.1% |
| 2011 | AAPL +26%, QCOM +12%, GOOG +9%, MSFT −5%, ORCL −17%, AMZN −4%, INTC +19%, CSCO −10%, TEVA −21%, SBUX +45% | 5.5% | 3.5% |
| 2012 | AAPL +33%, MSFT +6%, GOOG +10%, ORCL +32%, INTC −12%, CSCO +12%, QCOM +15%, AMZN +45%, AMGN +37%, CMCSA +61% | 23.7% | 18.1% |
| 2013 | AAPL +8%, MSFT +44%, GOOG +58%, ORCL +16%, AMZN +59%, QCOM +22%, CSCO +17%, INTC +31%, CMCSA +42%, AMGN +35% | 33.2% | 36.6% |
| 2014 | AAPL +41%, MSFT +28%, GOOG −5%, AMZN −22%, INTC +44%, QCOM +2%, CSCO +28%, GILD +26%, CMCSA +13%, FB +43% | 19.6% | 19.2% |
| 2015 | AAPL −3%, MSFT +23%, GOOGL +47%, INTC −2%, FB +34%, GILD +9%, CSCO +1%, AMZN +118%, QCOM −31%, CMCSA −1% | 19.4% | 9.4% |
| 2016 | AAPL +12%, GOOGL +2%, MSFT +15%, AMZN +11%, FB +10%, GILD −28%, INTC +9%, CMCSA +25%, CSCO +15%, AMGN −8% | 6.4% | 7.1% |
| 2017 | AAPL +48%, GOOGL +33%, MSFT +41%, AMZN +56%, FB +53%, INTC +31%, CSCO +31%, CMCSA +17%, AMGN +22%, KHC −8% | 32.5% | 32.7% |
| 2018 | AAPL −5%, GOOGL −1%, MSFT +21%, AMZN +28%, FB −26%, CMCSA −13%, INTC +4%, CSCO +17%, AMGN +15%, CELG −39% | 0.2% | −0.1% |
| 2019 | AAPL +89%, AMZN +23%, MSFT +58%, GOOGL +28%, FB +57%, CSCO +14%, INTC +31%, NVDA +77%, NFLX +21%, CMCSA +34% | 43.1% | 39.0% |
| 2020 | AAPL +82%, MSFT +43%, GOOGL +31%, AMZN +76%, FB +33%, INTC −15%, CMCSA +19%, CSCO −3%, PEP +12%, ADBE +52% | 32.9% | 48.4% |
| 2021 | AAPL +35%, MSFT +52%, AMZN +2%, GOOGL +65%, TSLA +50%, FB +23%, NVDA +125%, PYPL −19%, ADBE +13%, CMCSA −2% | 34.5% | 27.4% |
| 2022 | AAPL −26%, MSFT −28%, GOOGL −39%, AMZN −50%, FB −64%, TSLA −65%, NVDA −50%, AVGO −13%, ADBE −41%, CSCO −22% | −39.9% | −32.6% |
| 2023 | MSFT +58%, AAPL +49%, GOOGL +58%, AMZN +81%, NVDA +239%, TSLA +102%, META +194%, PEP −3%, AVGO +104%, COST +49% | 93.1% | 54.9% |
| 2024 | AAPL +31%, MSFT +13%, GOOGL +36%, AMZN +44%, AVGO +110%, META +66%, NVDA +171%, TSLA +63%, COST +40%, ADBE −25% | 54.9% | 25.6% |
| 2025 | AAPL +9%, NVDA +39%, MSFT +16%, AMZN +5%, GOOGL +66%, AVGO +51%, TSLA +11%, META +13%, COST −5%, NFLX +5% | 21.0% | 20.8% |
What the calculator says
The permanent portfolio alone doesn’t keep up with the top of the K. Since 1987 it has returned 7.3% a year, steadily, against 4.7% for top-of-the-K prices. After a 2% draw, tax and fees, the family keeps its buying power for 30 years in 5% of simulated histories, and the median family ends with $28.3M in today’s prices. It almost never runs out; it just shrinks.
Tech does the heavy lifting. The Nasdaq-100 has returned 14.7% a year since 1987, with dividends counted from 1999. At the defaults — $50M, 50% in QQQ and 50% in the permanent portfolio, a 2% draw rising with the top of the K, federal tax at the top rates, 0.5% in fees, paid for by selling — the fortune keeps its buying power in 92% of histories, and the median family ends 30 years later with $181M. More tech helps up to about 50%; past that the chance of keeping up barely moves while the chance of running out rises: all in QQQ, 90% keep up and 3% run out. The draw that keeps up three times in four is about 3.4% a year at the defaults, against 0.6% in the permanent portfolio alone.
When you start matters. Starting the history in 1999, the year QQQ launched and a year before the dot-com peak, the defaults keep up in 79% of histories, and all in QQQ in 72%, with 10% running out: the Nasdaq-100 fell 83% from its 2000 peak to its 2002 low. In real history, all 10 overlapping 30-year stretches since 1987 kept their buying power at the defaults.
The ten biggest stocks beat QQQ, unevenly. Each year’s ten largest Nasdaq-100 companies, held in equal parts and re-picked at every year-end, returned 12.5% a year from 1999 to 2025, against 10.8% for QQQ. They were ahead of QQQ, counting from 1999, at 20 of the 24 year-ends through 2022, but the lead swung: it was 10% at the end of 2021 and gone a year later, when the ten fell 40% to QQQ’s 33%. Then they pulled away, returning 54% a year from 2023 to 2025 against 33%, as the biggest companies left the rest of the index behind. The ten fell further in 2000 (47% against 36%) and less in 2002 and 2008. With history from 1999, the defaults keep up in 87% of histories with the ten and 79% with QQQ, and the draw that keeps up three times in four is 2.9% against 2.2%; all in the ten, 80% keep up and 8% run out, against 72% and 10% all in QQQ. The simulated histories draw on 2023 to 2025 as often as on any other years, and those three years carry much of the ten’s edge.
History flatters tech. These 39 years include the 1990s boom and a run since 2009 in which QQQ returned 20.5% a year, and the simulated histories can only reshuffle them. Take 3 points a year off tech returns and the defaults keep up in 81% of histories; all in QQQ, 77%. With 3 points off, the draw that keeps up three times in four falls to 2.4%.
Borrowing adds a little. Borrowing the draw instead of selling raises the chance of keeping up from 92% to 96% at the defaults, with 0.5% running out. About half of that comes from not selling, which puts off the tax on gains: with no taxes at all, borrowing raises the chance from 96% to 98%. The rest is leverage, as in C.001: the loan has cost less than the portfolio earned.
How the calculator works
The portfolio. A share in tech and the rest in Harry Browne’s permanent portfolio: a quarter each in US stocks (the S&P 500), long-term Treasury bonds, gold and cash (3-month Treasury bills), rebalanced every year. Tech is either QQQ, the fund that tracks the Nasdaq-100, or the ten largest Nasdaq-100 companies at each year-end, held in equal parts for the next year. Fees come off every year (0.5% by default).
History. Each year from 1987 to 2025 carries: QQQ’s total return (from 2000; for 1999, Nasdaq’s own total-return index; before that the Nasdaq-100’s price change, without dividends, as Nasdaq’s total-return index does for those years); from 1999, the return of that year’s ten (below); the S&P 500’s total return, the 3-month T-bill return and the price of gold (Aswath Damodaran, NYU Stern); the total return of the Vanguard Long-Term Treasury fund (VUSTX), the long-Treasury fund with the longest record; CPI-U inflation from December to December; and the lowest close of the year for the Nasdaq-100, the ten and the S&P 500 (for the ten, stocks without daily prices are assumed to follow the Nasdaq-100 through the year, bent to end at their own return). Long Treasuries start in 1987 because the Vanguard fund began in May 1986. A simulated history strings together runs of consecutive years, 5 on average (shorter than C.001’s 8 because the modern sample is short), wrapping from 2025 back to the start year; “History from 1999” draws only from 1999 on. Everyone sees the same 2,000 histories.
The ten. At each year-end from 1998, the ten largest companies in the Nasdaq-100 by market value, from the holdings of funds that track the index: ProFunds for 1998 and 1999, the USAA Nasdaq-100 Index Fund for 2000 to 2013 and Invesco’s QQQ from 2019, all from their reports to the SEC, and for 2014 a PowerShares QQQ brochure. For 2015 to 2018, when no year-end list turned up, QQQ’s September 30 holdings stand in. A company’s share classes count together. The ten are held in equal parts through the next year, with dividends reinvested, then picked again, so companies that later collapsed, like WorldCom, Sun Microsystems and Yahoo, are in for the years they were among the biggest. Returns are from Yahoo Finance, and for companies it no longer carries, from fund reports and other records. Three were taken over in a year they were held (TCI by AT&T in 1999, Immunex by Amgen in 2002, Nextel by Sprint in 2005): each counts at what the deal paid when it closed (for TCI, at its last price we have, five days earlier), and the money then earns the T-bill rate until the next pick. The lists, each stock’s return and the sources are in modern-top10.csv.
Prices, spending and borrowing work as in C.001: the family’s prices rise with CPI plus 1.8% a year, compounded; the draw is taken at the start of each year; a borrowing family adds each draw and the interest (SOFR, 3.95% on Oct 30, 2026, plus 1.25 points at $50M) to the loan, the bank tests it at the year’s low, and the family sells at year-end to stay under its own limit. Banks lend against about 65% of stocks and funds, 90% of Treasuries, 50% of gold funds and 95% of cash. No lender publishes a rate for gold funds; generic ETF advance rates run 50-85% (Osaic), 60% (Wells Fargo) and 65% (Customers Bank), and gold funds such as GLD are commodity trusts some lenders may not take, so we use 50%.
Taxes. 2026’s top federal rates for the whole history: 23.8% on qualified dividends and long-term gains, 40.8% on interest, and 31.8% on gains from gold, which the tax code treats as a collectible. The state options add each state’s top rate on dividends and gains: California 13.3% (top rate, above $1M of taxable income); New York State 10.9% (top rate, above $25M of taxable income; 9.65% above about $2.2M for a married couple and 10.3% above $5M); New York City 14.776% (New York State’s 10.9% plus the city’s 3.876%); Connecticut 6.99% (top rate, above $1M of taxable income for a married couple). Treasury interest is exempt from state tax. Top rates fit the largest fortunes; smaller ones would pay less, as C.001 explains. Dividends are taxed at 2025’s yields (0.55% for QQQ and the ten, 1.34% for the S&P 500); bond interest at the 10-year Treasury yield at the start of each year; bills in full. Gains are realized only when the family sells, at a blend of the rates for what it holds, on the gain above the portfolio’s average cost; the starting cost basis is a setting, for the investments, with cash at cost. Rebalancing is assumed not to realize gains.
What it leaves out. Everything C.001 leaves out (estate taxes and trusts, the step-up in basis at death, other assets, changes in tax law), plus two things particular to this one. The sample is short and American: 39 years, with the best decade tech stocks have had, so the histories can recombine those years but not invent worse ones. And no one knew in 1987 which stocks would lead; picking the Nasdaq-100 at all, with hindsight, flatters the result. Use “Tech returns vs history” to take points off.
Hypothetical results. The results come from a model run on historical data. They do not reflect actual investment results and are not a guarantee of future results; they change with each setting and as the data are updated. The model considers only the assets above and a securities-based loan; investments and strategies it doesn’t consider may do as well or better. Nothing here is investment, tax or legal advice.
Sources. Nasdaq-100 index and QQQ, VUSTX and stock prices: Yahoo Finance. S&P 500, T-bill and gold returns: Damodaran, NYU Stern. Inflation: BLS CPI-U via FRED. Rates, loan pricing, lending limits and taxes: see C.001, and on gold, IRS Topic 409 and the SPDR Gold Trust 10-K. The permanent portfolio and the Nasdaq-100: Harry Browne, Fail-Safe Investing (1999), as quoted in Derek Sivers’ notes, Nasdaq: NDX versions (the total-return index starts March 4, 1999), Nasdaq OMX: XNDX fact sheet, 4Q 2013 (1999 total return). The annual series: modern-annual.csv; the ten, with the fund filings each list comes from: modern-top10.csv.